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Contemporary Visions of the Early Federalist 
Ideology of James Madison: An Analysis of the 
United States Supreme Court’s Treatment of The 
Federalist No. 39 
Michael J. Mano∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The theory of “New Federalism” was one of the dominant themes 
guiding Republican politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s.1 In 
retrospect, it should have come as no surprise that four of the Justices 
appointed to the Supreme Court by Presidents Reagan and George 
H.W. Bush have proven to be rigid advocates of state sovereignty.2 
Headed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, a Republican appointee,3 the 
current Court’s conservative majority4 has been the most aggressive 
∗  J.D. 2004, Washington University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor 
Theodore Ruger for his invaluable input and enthusiasm on the subject matter of this Note and 
Professor Conrad Weiler for his insightful comments on earlier drafts. This Note is dedicated to 
my mother, whose fight with cancer has inspired me in more ways than she could imagine. 
 1. See Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism—An American 
Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 290–91 
(1996). “New Federalists” advocate a novel shift in the balance of power from the national 
government to the state. Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay 
on the New Federalism and Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 626 (1995). 
 2. Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
appropriately have been described as “anti-federalists” because they harbor strong views that 
the Constitution imposes strict limitations on the national government. Michael C. Dorf, No 
Federalists Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 
741, 741 (2000). Professor Chemerinsky concisely summed up the Rehnquist Court’s view of 
federalism as follows: “[t]he first principle that explains many of the Rehnquist Court’s 
decisions is that in conflicts between the federal and state governments, state governments 
win.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 37, 37 (1999).  
 3. President Nixon nominated Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1971. President Reagan 
selected Rehnquist for Chief Justice. 
 4. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 41 (arguing that a majority of Justices on the 
Rehnquist Court pursue a decisively conservative agenda). 
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Supreme Court in history in terms of shifting the balance of power 
from the national government to the states.5 
While the current conservative majority has embarked upon an 
unprecedented campaign to restrict the power of the national 
government,6 several Justices have adhered rigidly to the 
“textualism,” or “originalism,”7 school of constitutional thought.8 
Under this interpretive regime, the Justices have attempted to base 
their holdings on the original meaning of the Constitution.9  
In seeking to discern the original intent of the Constitution’s 
Framers, adherents to the textualism viewpoint rely heavily upon the 
language of the Constitution, writings of the Framers, and various 
other records believed to shed light on the Framers’ beliefs and 
intentions.10 A dramatic increase in citations to the writings of the 
more influential Framers, especially those of James Madison and 
Alexander Hamilton, has accompanied the Rehnquist Court’s shift to 
textualism.11 The Federalist papers recently have emerged as a 
particular favorite.12 
Among the Rehnquist Court’s decisions that have expanded state 
power, one of the most commonly cited works is Federalist 39,13 
 5. See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, 
and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1718 (2002) 
(analyzing the activist trend of the Rehnquist Court’s conservative majority); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 429, 430 (2002) (noting that the Court has found ten federal acts unconstitutional on 
“grounds involving federalism” since Justice Thomas’s appointment in 1991, whereas the Court 
had found only one federal statute in violation of “principles of constitutional federalism” 
during the previous fifty years). 
 6. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 7. The terms “texualism” and “originalism” as used in this Note are synonymous and 
refer to the theory that, for the purpose of Constitutional interpretation, the precise meaning of 
the words is controlling. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 23 (1997). 
 8. Most notably, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas have demonstrated a consistent 
commitment to originalism in interpreting the Constitution. CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, HOW TO 
READ THE CONSTITUTION: ORIGINALISM, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, AND JUDICIAL 
POWER 176 (1996). 
 9. See supra note 7. 
 10. See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 38 (showing that Justice Scalia relies on the Federalist 
papers and other related works because such “informed” writings demonstrate how the 
Constitution was originally understood). 
 11. See infra note 53. 
 12. See id.; discussion infra note 53. 
 13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) [hereinafter FEDERALIST 39]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/13
p257 Mano book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Contemporary Treatment of Federalist 39 259 
 
 
 
authored by James Madison. The Court has cited this piece in eight 
decisions since 1985.14 While it is clear that a majority of Justices on 
the current Court believe that Madison would have endorsed their 
unprecedented expansion of the sphere of state power,15 it is unclear 
how this belief actually comports with Madison’s early federalist 
ideology.16 
This Note will examine the current Court’s vision of Madison’s 
early federalist ideology. It will analyze the eight Supreme Court 
cases that have cited Federalist 39 by looking at the way the Court 
has used the essay, and by examining its language in the context of 
Madison’s other writings. The aim of this Note is to portray how 
Madison might have responded to the Court’s use of his essay as 
definitive authority for its expansion of the powers of the states vis-à-
vis the national government. It will conclude that during the framing 
of the Constitution and the subsequent composition of Federalist 39, 
Madison was a fervent nationalist who would never have advocated 
 14. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002); Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142 n.3 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
714–15 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920–21 (1997); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 839 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239 n.2 (1985); Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985). 
 15. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 751–52 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Federalist 
39 for the proposition that, in ratifying the Constitution, the states “entered the Union ‘with 
their sovereignty intact’”); Alden, 527 U.S. at 714–15 (Kennedy, J.) (asserting that Madison’s 
statement that the states would retain a “residual and inviolable sovereignty” indicates 
Madison’s belief that states “retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty”); 
Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–22 (Scalia, J.) (asserting that Madison and the Framers intended to 
create a system of dual sovereignty, which would not empower the national government to 
regulate the conduct of states or its officials); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 582–83 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (claiming that Madison believed the division of power between the state and 
national governments under the Constitution would produce a system in which the states would 
bear significant authority at the expense of the powers of the national government). 
 16. The focus of this Note is limited to the original meaning of Federalist 39. The analysis 
centers upon Madison’s early federalist ideology, his viewpoint during the period between his 
first term as a national legislator under the Articles of Confederation in 1780, and the 
ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791. This Note contends that during this time, Madison was 
a fervent nationalist who tirelessly advocated for an expanded national government. Notably, 
persuasive evidence suggests that after this time, Madison underwent an ideological shift and 
became more friendly to a restrictive national government. See LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED 
FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 294 
(1995). However, Madison’s beliefs during his later years had no impact on the composition of 
Federalist 39 or on the drafting of the Constitution and, therefore are outside the scope of this 
Note. 
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the pro-state position that the majority of the Rehnquist Court has 
taken. However, because of the nature and ambiguities of the 
Federalist papers, Madison’s broad and general statements, when 
isolated from accompanying text, other writing, and from the context 
of his ideology, can be cited to support either state sovereignty or 
strong national power; however, when viewed alongside his other 
essays, letters, and records, Madison’s true nationalist ideology 
emerges. 
Part I of this Note examines the history of the composition and 
publication of Federalist 39, including a textual analysis of the essay, 
an account of the circumstances under which it was written and 
published, a discussion of Madison’s attitudes regarding the 
Constitution and his participation in its framing, and a survey of the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of Federalist 39. Section II presents an 
analysis of the Supreme Court’s use of the essay. Finally, section III 
concludes that the current Court has corrupted Madison’s writings to 
support a federalist ideology inconsistent with Madison’s own. 
I. HISTORY 
A. James Madison: Legislator, Delegate, Advocate, Author 
James Madison served as a national legislator for his home state, 
Virginia, under the Articles of Confederation, and his experience in 
this capacity convinced him that the governing structure of the 
Articles was deeply flawed.17 Madison’s core criticism of the Articles 
was that state governments enjoyed far too much sovereignty, 
rendering the national government virtually powerless18 and enabling 
 17. JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
45 (1990) [hereinafter RAKOVE, MADISON AND THE CREATION]. 
 18. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 47–50 (1997) [hereinafter RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS]; see also JAMES 
MADISON: WRITINGS 69–80 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) [hereinafter RAKOVE, WRITINGS]. In 
April, 1787 Madison drafted a memorandum, Vices of the Political System of the United States, 
in which he articulated twelve specific criticisms of the governing structure of the Articles of 
Confederation. WRITINGS, supra, at 69. Of the twelve “vices” that Madison listed, nine related 
directly to his belief that the states enjoyed far too much sovereign authority under the Articles: 
1) the failure of the states to comply with constitutional requisitions; 2) the encroachment by the 
states upon the national government; 3) the propensity of the states to encroach upon each 
others’ rights; 4) the need for uniformity in the law, unattainable under the Articles; 5) the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/13
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the states to oppress the rights of minority interests within their 
borders.19 Madison attempted to work within the Articles of 
Confederation to fortify the national government against the states’ 
reckless abuse of their sovereignty. He believed the vesting of 
“coercive powers” within the national government was necessary for 
its proper operation.20 Madison believed this concentrated power 
could mitigate the disturbances by states which threatened to impede 
the proper functioning of the young Union.21 
Madison set this belief into motion during the first congressional 
assembly under the Articles when he drafted an ill-fated amendment 
authorizing the national legislature to employ armed forces to compel 
reluctant states to comply with national directives.22 Frustrated by his 
thwarted attempts to empower the national government against the 
states, Madison became an outspoken advocate of orchestrating a 
convention for the purposes of drafting a new structure of national 
governance.23 After one unsuccessful attempt, Madison and his 
colleagues successfully organized the Constitutional Convention of 
1787 (“the Convention”), held in Philadelphia.24  
inability of states to prevent internal violence; 6) the multiplicity of laws within the states; 7) 
the mutability of state laws; 8) the injustice of state laws; and 9) the impotence of state laws. Id. 
at 69–80. 
 Madison elaborated on many of his criticisms of the state governments under the Articles 
in a letter to George Washington dated April 16, 1787. Id. at 80. In this letter, Madison claimed 
that the state governments routinely invaded the national government’s jurisdiction and 
persistently harassed each other with frivolous actions motivated in large part by the states’ 
self-interest. Id. at 81. 
 19. WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 81. In his letter to George Washington, Madison claimed 
that an extended national government was needed to act as a disinterested mediator in 
empassioned conflicts between majority and minority interests within the states. Id. Madison 
observed that within the states, majorities have the ability to render binding policy decisions, 
and often have an interest in abusing this ability at the expense of minority interests. Id. 
 20. Id. at 13 (letter to Thomas Jefferson dated April 16, 1781). 
 21. Id. 
 22. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 37. 
 23. RAKOVE, MADISON AND THE CREATION, supra note 17, at 40. Though Madison 
originally believed it best to make changes within the Articles of Confederation, he eventually 
embraced the idea of a constitutional convention and became one of its chief supporters. Id. at 
39–40. 
 24. The first Constitutional Convention, held in Annapolis, Maryland in 1786, had a 
limited agenda relating to commerce policy under the Articles of Confederation. RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 28. Delegates from only five of the thirteen states 
attended. Id. at 32. At this meeting, the delegates agreed to disband without adopting any 
substantive national policy changes and recommended that an immediate general convention 
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Madison believed that the purpose of the Convention was to draft 
a Constitution that would significantly enlarge the power and 
authority of the national government, and at the same time reduce the 
power of the states as much as possible.25 Ideologically, many 
schisms emerged at the Convention. Two of the most pressing arose 
between the large and small states26 and between federalists and anti-
involving all states take place in Philadelphia to revise the Articles. Id. at 32. 
 25. See, e.g., WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 64; discussion supra note 19 and text 
accompanying notes 20–21. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson dated March 19, 1787, Madison 
claimed that his first goal at the convention was to establish a national government under a 
Constitution which would be “clearly paramount” to the state governments. WRITINGS, supra 
note 18, at 64. Continuing to elaborate on his vision of the proper national government, 
Madison claimed that beyond the power to regulate trade and any other matter where 
“uniformity is proper,” the national government should be armed with the power to veto acts of 
the state legislatures “in all cases whatsoever.” Id. 
 In a note to Edmund Randolph dated April 8, 1787, Madison also expressed his belief that 
the power of the new national government should be expanded dramatically. He claimed, “in 
framing a system, no material sacrifices ought to be made to local or temporary prejudices.” 2 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 337 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1901). Madison claimed that the 
national government should possess “positive and complete authority in all cases where 
uniform measures are necessary, as in trade . . . . “ Id. at 338.  
 In a letter to George Washington dated April 16, 1787, Madison made clear the general 
theme underlying his view of federalism, stating:  
Conceiving that an individual independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with 
their aggregate sovereignty, and that a consolidation of the whole into one simple 
republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable, I have sought for middle ground, 
which may at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and not exclude 
the local authorities wherever they can be subordinately useful. 
Id. at 344–45 (emphasis added). 
 26. The dispute between the large and small states centered primarily around the question 
of whether representation in the new legislature should be based on population (the system used 
in the current House of Representatives) or a scheme of equal representation among the states 
(as used in the current Senate). RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 60–61. 
Debate along these lines focused on the infamous Virginia and New Jersey Plans. Id. at 61–63. 
 Madison helped draft the Virginia Plan. Id. at 59. The Virginia Plan represented the 
position of the large states and proposed a significant expansion of the power of the national 
government at the expense of the states. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
165 (Max Farrand ed., Yale University Press 1937) (1911) [hereinafter RECORDS]. Discussing 
the Virginia Plan’s legislative veto provision, Madison claimed that a chief function of the new 
national government would be to control states which, without a strong national government, 
would “continually fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the 
political system.” Id. In carrying out this goal, the Virginia Plan called for representation in the 
national legislature to be based on the number of free inhabitants of a given state, rather than 
giving each state equal representation, as in the Articles. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra 
note 18, at 60–61. Madison believed that a system of equal representation in the legislature 
would frustrate the national government and enable minority factions to exert undue influence 
over national policy. Id. at 64. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/13
p257 Mano book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Contemporary Treatment of Federalist 39 263 
 
 
 
federalists.27 Madison was an advocate of the position taken by the 
large states and, unlike many of his Virginia colleagues (most notably 
George Mason28), was also a strong nationalist (or federalist).29 
Throughout the course of the Convention, Madison fought 
aggressively against anti-federalist attempts to restrict the power of 
the national government, and simultaneously advocated tirelessly for 
expansive language and for power to be conferred upon the national 
government in the Constitution.30 
Early in the Convention, Madison established the foundation of 
his position on federalism, the idea that under the new Constitution, 
 The small states present at the convention responded to the Virginia Plan with the New 
Jersey Plan, which in many ways resembled the Articles of Confederation, and demonstrated 
the fear among the small states of an expanded national government. Id. at 63. The New Jersey 
Plan demanded equal representation among the states in both houses of the legislature, in 
accordance with the system under the Articles. Id. 
 Madison viewed the New Jersey Plan as a threat to the proper expansion of the national 
government’s power. Id. at 64. Madison criticized the New Jersey Plan because (1) it did not go 
far enough to prevent state intrusion upon the national government’s power, (2) it would not 
prevent states from trespassing upon each other, and (3) it did not protect minority interests 
within the states themselves. 1 RECORDS, supra, at 314–22. 
 After weeks of debate, the two sides reached a compromise; they agreed upon 
representation in the House of Representatives (the lower chambers of Congress) under a 
scheme of proportional representation based upon population, and representation in the Senate 
(the upper chambers of Congress) under a scheme of equal representation among the states, 
regardless of population. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 70. Madison did not 
support this compromise. Id. at 68. He believed that even if the legislature were divided in this 
way, factions within the Senate would be able to derail legitimate exercises of national policy 
approved in the House of Representatives. Id. 
 27. The debate between the federalists and anti-federalists centered upon the extent of 
power of the national government under the new Constitution. The federalists, led at the 
Convention by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, took the position that the national 
government’s power should be expanded dramatically. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 525 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1993) (1969). The anti-
federalists, led by George Mason, Elbridge Gerry, and Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph, 
were leery of the impact an expanded national government would have upon the sovereignty of 
the individual states. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 112–13. Mason, Gerry, 
and Randolph subsequently refused to sign the final draft of the Constitution and embarked 
upon a well-publicized national campaign aimed at dissuading the states from ratifying the 
Constitution they had helped draft. Id. at 106–07, 113. 
 28. Unlike Madison, who feared that the power wielded by the state governments under 
the Articles was extremely dangerous to the proper operation of the national government, 
Mason expressed his concern at the Convention that the states should have “means of defending 
themselves [against] encroachments of the [National Government].” RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 62. 
 29. See WOOD, supra note 27. 
 30. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 356–58. 
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the more extensive the national government in relation to the states, 
the “greater [the] probability of duration, happiness and good 
order.”31 Elaborating on this position, Madison advanced the view 
that the state governments were inherently subordinate entities, 
beneficial only because it would be inconvenient for the national 
government to regulate all areas of the Union.32 During the 
Convention, Madison went so far as to claim that if it were 
practicable for the national government to absorb the state 
governments completely, “no fatal consequence could result.”33 
Central to Madison’s nationalist arguments during the Convention 
was his opinion regarding the power dynamic that existed between 
the states and the national government under the Articles. Madison 
claimed that the national government was far less likely to encroach 
upon the states than the other way around, and that the consequences 
of encroachment by the states would be much more fatal to the Union 
than the risks posed by the national government.34 Madison was a 
firm advocate for the vesting of a veto power in the national 
legislature, which would allow for the invalidation of any state law 
deemed “improper.”35 Madison saw the veto as absolutely essential to 
preventing the self-interested states from continuing to frustrate 
national government objectives.36 
 31. Id. at 141. 
 32. Id. at 357. 
 33. Id. at 358. 
 34. Id. at 356. An ardent scholar of ancient history, Madison observed that the State 
governments of ancient confederacies throughout history had never faced danger of the 
destruction by intrusion of the national government. Id. at 367. 
 35. Id. at 162, 164. Madison’s second justification for the legislative veto was that it was 
necessary to prevent instability and injustice in the legislation of the state governments. 
WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 146. Madison was concerned that without the veto, majority 
factions within the states easily would be able to oppress the rights of minority interests within 
their borders. Id. at 150. Though he did concede that majority factions could form at the 
national level, Madison viewed these factions as much more dangerous when operating within 
the states. Id.  
 Madison incorporated the veto power into the Virginia Plan alongside another provision 
which would have conferred upon the federal government the power to use military force to 
coerce reluctant state governments into compliance with national directives. See 1 RECORDS, 
supra note 26, at 164–66; 2 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 27–28; RAVOKE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 60. 
 36. WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 64. 
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When it became clear that he could not build enough support to 
implement the veto provision, Madison suggested an alternative plan 
which would have empowered the national legislature to directly 
enact temporary laws within the states themselves.37 Despite his 
efforts, the Convention chose not to adopt the national veto power or 
the national authority to enact state law provisions. Upon defeat, 
Madison shifted his attention to the drafting of the Supremacy and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses, which he believed would serve as 
definitive and expansive statements of the national government’s 
power.38 
After the Convention was over and the Constitution finalized, 
Madison returned to Congress, then located in New York City, and 
continued his advocacy for a strong national government through his 
writings and his representation of Virginia in the ratification effort.39 
During this time, Madison drafted his contributions to the Federalist 
papers40 at the bidding of Alexander Hamilton, a delegate and native 
of New York, who believed the ratification effort in his state was in 
danger of failing.41 
Even after the Constitution was ratified, the debate over its 
contents and the state/national power dynamic was far from over. 
Many states had attempted to condition their ratification upon the 
 37. 2 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 28. 
 38. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 180; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 
44, at 320–23 (James Madison). While Madison was heartened by the firm language of the 
Supremacy and Necessary and Proper Clauses, he continued, even after the Convention closed, 
to advocate for the national veto. WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 148 (letter to Thomas Jefferson 
dated October 24, 1787). 
 39. RAKOVE, MADISON AND THE CREATION, supra note 17, at 70, 74. 
 40. Id. at 71. 
 41. THE FEDERALIST: BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, AND JOHN JAY 7 
(Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., MetroBooks 2002) (1961) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST]. 
While twelve of the thirteen states were represented at the Convention (Rhode Island did not 
send delegates), the Constitution needed the ratification of only nine states. U.S. CONST. art. 
VII. Upon ratification by the requisite nine states, the Articles of Confederation would be 
dissolved and the Constitution binding upon the states that agreed to ratify. ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 104. 
 The ratification process itself was centered around a series of conventions at which 
advocates and opponents of the Constitution voiced their arguments. Though the votes in many 
states were very close, the Constitution was officially ratified with the vote of the ninth state, 
New Hampshire, on June 21, 1788. Id. at 121–22. Rhode Island was the last state to join the 
new Union when it voted to ratify in May, 1790. Id. at 128. 
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immediate drafting of a bill of rights to be included within the 
Constitution,42 or upon an amendment specifying that the powers not 
enumerated in the Constitution would be reserved to the states.43 
After the Constitution was ratified, much of the debate during the 
first meetings of Congress under the centered around the language of 
the proposed reserved powers amendment, which would eventually 
become the Tenth Amendment. Anti-federalists looking to limit the 
powers of the national government drafted versions that used the term 
“expressly” and “clearly” to communicate that Congress’s powers 
were restricted to those specifically enumerated in the Constitution.44 
Madison believed that the inclusion of these limiting terms posed a 
grave threat to what he viewed would be one of the most critical 
sources of the new national government’s authority, implied 
powers.45 Madison was eventually successful in excluding the 
 42. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Virginia, the eighth, ninth, and tenth states to 
ratify, rejected efforts by anti-federalists to condition ratification on the adoption of 
amendments. ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 120–24. In the alternative, the states 
offered “recommended” amendments alongside their ratification. Id. New York took a different 
approach. It offered a series of amendments and classified some as “explanatory.” Id. at 125. 
Although New York did not technically condition its ratification upon the adoption of the 
amendments, those that it labeled as “explanatory” served to explain how New York believed 
the Constitution would work. Id. at 125–26. North Carolina and Rhode Island, the last two 
states to ratify, also offered “recommended” amendments. Id. at 128. 
 43. Five states—New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and New 
Hampshire—insisted on an amendment reserving power to the states. James B. Staab, The 
Tenth Amendment and Justice Scalia’s “Split Personality”, 16 J.L. & POL. 231, 240 (2000). 
 44. Of the five states that proposed a reserved powers amendment, only Virginia’s 
proposal did not include the terms “expressly” or “clearly.” Id. 
 45. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 
683 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. Debating the 
language of the Tenth Amendment in Congress, Madison objected to a motion to include the 
term “expressly” in the reserved powers amendment. Id. Madison claimed that “there must 
necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the [C]onstitution descended to recount 
every minutiae.” Id. Relying on his extensive knowledge of the history of ancient 
confederacies, Madison went on to claim that “no government ever existed which was not 
necessarily obliged to exercise powers by implication.” Id. Madison believed that for the new 
national government to be successful, it needed to rely upon what he called “The Doctrine of 
Implication.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). Madison believed that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause of the Constitution allowed the national government to wield implied powers 
where necessary to secure ends authorized under its enumerated powers. Id.  
 Significantly, while Madison endorsed the Doctrine of Implication, he recognized that the 
Constitution placed limits on its use. In a speech delivered to Congress on Feb 2, 1791, 
Madison argued that the national government lacked the constitutional authority to establish a 
national bank. He argued that the national government lacked the constitutional authority and 
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restrictive terms from the Tenth Amendment, and in this victory he 
secured for the national government the authority to wield implied 
powers in administering national directives.46  
 B. The Federalist Papers: Pulp Journalism or Definitive Authority? 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay did not intend 
the Federalist papers to be philosophical treatises or roadmaps to 
constitutional interpretation.47 Rather, they wrote the essays with the 
clear intent to publish them in a public forum, and their sole purpose 
was to persuade undecided citizens in New York to vote to ratify the 
Constitution.48 Their mission, simple and effective, was to directly 
address the arguments of the anti-federalists, critics of the 
Constitution, who were publishing articles attacking the Constitution 
and advocating the principles embodied in the Articles of 
Confederation.49 The anti-federalists’ chief concern was the loss of 
state sovereignty under the Constitution, sovereignty expressly 
preserved under the Articles.50 
Although the authors did not intend them as treatises,51 within the 
last century the Federalist papers have come to be regarded as some 
of the most important writings of early American history.52 One 
peculiar upshot to their rise in academic popularity has been the 
cautioned against a broad interpretation of the Doctrine of Implication. WRITINGS, supra note 
18, at 486. He made clear his belief that the implied powers legitimately wielded by the national 
government must be merely means to attain a constitutionally authorized, or enumerated, end. 
Id. Madison believed that if the means were not sufficiently related to the enumerated ends, the 
national government would overstep its constitutional authority. Id. 
 46. See supra note 45. 
 47. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 11. The fact that neither Madison nor Hamilton 
made any attempt to save their drafts or original manuscripts is evidence that they intended the 
essays to have limited scope. Id. at ix. Moreover, the authors did not identify who had written 
each essay until well after publication. Id. at 9–10. In fact, historians today still debate the true 
identity of each author. Id. at 8. Madison did not even offer support in assembling the first 
complete publication of the essays in 1788. Id. at ix–x. 
 48. Id. at 11, 14. The essays, each written under a pen name, first appeared in New York 
newspapers after the conclusion of the Convention, and continued throughout New York’s 
ratification process. The first appeared on October 27, 1787, and the last was published on April 
4, 1788, just a few months before New York’s ratification process concluded. Id. at 3. 
 49. Id. at 6–7. 
 50. ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 18, at 146. 
 51. See supra note 47. 
 52. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at xiv. 
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Supreme Court’s dramatically increased use of the essays as legal 
authority.53 Many of the Framers, including Madison, recorded 
voluminous notes and essays concerning the drafting and intended 
operation of the Constitution.54 Additionally, various participants of 
the convention, including Madison compiled lengthy records from 
the Convention itself.55 Despite the existence of these records, the 
Supreme Court has chosen to cite the Federalist papers with 
increasing, and some might say disturbing, frequency.56  
Traditionally, many legal scholars labeled the authoritative value 
of the Federalist papers as dubious at best, because of the modest 
intentions of the authors and the fact that the essays were written so 
hastily.57 Despite some valid criticism of their use, it is clear that the 
Federalist papers have become integrated and woven into the very 
fabric of modern constitutional jurisprudence. 
C. Federalist 39: The Language 
James Madison composed The Federalist No. 39 under the pen 
name “Publius.”58 Federalist 39, entitled Republicanism, 
Nationalism, Federalism, addresses the nature of the proposed 
structure of governance under the Constitution and its planned 
separation of powers between the state and national governments. 
Federalist 39 is divided into two parts. The first portion is devoted to 
defining and exploring the structure of the republican government 
 53. From 1990 through 1998 the Federalist papers were cited in sixty Supreme Court 
decisions, which amounts to more than any other decade in the Court’s history and twice as 
many as any decade prior to 1980. Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The Federalist, 
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324, 1327–28 (1998). Between 1980 and 1998 the Court cited the 
Federalist papers in 116 cases, totaling more than the number of cases citing the essays during 
the 169 years between 1790 and 1959. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, REPORTED BY 
JAMES MADISON (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1966). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 57. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1998). Madison cautioned 
against the uncritical use of the Federalist papers stating, “the authors might be sometimes 
influenced by the zeal of advocates.” 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
436 (1865) (letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston dated April 17, 1824). 
 58. Madison first published the essay in The New York Journal on January 16, 1788. See 
WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 217. 
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under the Constitution.59 The second portion addresses the nature of 
the Constitution as it acts upon and through the national and state 
governments.60  
In Federalist 39, Madison directly addressed the character of the 
Constitution and the government it created, focusing specifically on 
the question of whether the Constitution created a “national” or a 
“federal” government.61 Madison concluded that it created neither; 
rather, it blended federal and national characteristics.62 To arrive at 
this conclusion, Madison analyzed five elements of the constitutional 
republican government: 1) the foundation of its establishment, 2) the 
sources of its power, 3) the operation of its powers, 4) the extent of 
its powers, and 5) the authority to change the Constitution.63  
Looking first at the foundation of the Constitution’s authority, 
Madison found that authority was established by a federal act that 
established a federal constitution.64 He based this finding on two 
observations. First, Madison cited the fact that the Constitution would 
be ratified by unanimous consent of the states as sovereign entities 
under the existing Articles of Confederation, not by a majority of the 
people acting through a national vote.65 Second, Madison observed 
that, in the context of ratification, each state is considered a 
sovereign, independent body, bound by its voluntary act.66 Madison 
concluded that through this mode of establishment, the Constitution 
would be a federal, rather than a national, Constitution.67 
Second, Madison found that the sources of power of the new 
government reflect both national and federal characteristics.68 
 59. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 280–82. This portion of Federalist 39 is primarily 
devoted to defining the concept of a “republican government,” which Madison explains is a 
government that derives its power from its citizens and is administered by individuals holding 
temporary, voluntary office during good behavior. This portion also explains why the 
Constitution creates a republican government and compares the structure of the Constitutional 
government with the governments of the states and other nations. Id. at 281–82.  
 60. Id. at 282–86. This Note focuses on the second portion of Federalist 39. 
 61. Id. at 282.  
 62. Id. at 286. 
 63. Id. at 282–83. 
 64. Id. at 283. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 283–84. 
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Madison reached this conclusion by examining the selection process 
of the two houses of the legislature.69 Madison found that because the 
House of Representatives derives its power from the people of the 
nation, proportionately represented, the government is national.70 
However, focusing on the Senate, Madison claimed that because it 
derives its power from the states and is divided on terms of equal 
representation among the states, this element of government is 
federal.71 Madison characterized the executive election process as 
partly federal and partly national.72  
Third, Madison concluded that the new government operates as a 
national government.73 Madison based this conclusion on the 
observation that a national government would act directly upon 
individual citizens comprising the nation while a federal government 
would act upon the political bodies constituting each sovereign 
state.74  
Madison then focused on the extent of the new government’s 
power and concluded that it was primarily federal.75 He arrived at this 
conclusion by defining a “national government” as one that possesses 
indefinite supremacy over all individuals and objects within its sphere 
of authority.76 Observing that the jurisdiction of the new government 
extended only to those powers enumerated in the Constitution, 
leaving all other powers to the states, Madison concluded that the 
Constitutional government could not be classified as exclusively 
national.77 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 284. The Seventeenth Amendment, adopted in 1913, changed the election 
system of the Senate, conferring the ability to choose Senators upon the citizens of the 
representative states. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1. Madison would have viewed this change 
as creating a national characteristic because it transferred the power to select Senators from the 
states to the public. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 283–84. However, the retention of the 
principle of equal representation in the Senate would represent a federal characteristic to 
Madison. Id. at 284. 
 72. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 284. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 284–85 (quoting FEDERALIST 39 (“[T]he proposed government cannot be 
deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and 
leaves to the several states a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”)). 
 76. Id. at 284. 
 77. Id. at 285. 
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Finally, Madison looked to the procedure for amending the 
Constitution and found that it contains elements properly 
characterized as both federal and national.78 Madison observed that 
by requiring ratification by more than a majority of states, rather than 
individuals, the amendment process bore a federal quality.79 
However, by requiring less than a unanimous vote of the states, the 
amendment process had a national quality as well.80 Madison 
ultimately concluded that the government under the Constitution was 
not purely national or federal, but a combination of both.81  
D. Use of Federalist 39 by the United States Supreme Court as 
Authority on Issues of Federalism 
Since 1985, the year it was first cited in a Supreme Court opinion 
addressing federalism, Federalist 39 has been cited as authority in 
eight cases and ten opinions authored by seven different Justices.82 In 
each of these cases, Federalist 39 was used in the context of 
questions regarding the proper balance of power between the national 
and state governments. 
The eight cases citing Federalist 39 can be divided into two 
groups: Tenth Amendment cases and Eleventh Amendment cases. 
While the legal issues underlying the two types of cases are different, 
the arguments employing Federalist 39 are analytically similar. 
1. Eleventh Amendment Cases 
Federalist 39 is cited as authority in three Eleventh Amendment 
cases through which the Supreme Court has successively expanded 
the states’ sovereign immunity even beyond the language of the 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 286. 
 82. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002); 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142 n.3 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 714–15 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920–21 (1997); U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 839 (1995) (Kennedy. J., concurring); id. at 846 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239; New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550, 570 
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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Eleventh Amendment.83 Although the Court had decided Eleventh 
Amendment issues without referencing Federalist 39 for over a 
century after it was written, the Court cited Federalist 39 in an 
Eleventh Amendment case for the first time in 1985 in Atascadero 
State Hospital v. Scanlon. The Scanlon majority held that the 
Eleventh Amendment’s guarantee of sovereign immunity to the states 
barred federal courts from hearing a private action against the State 
of California.84 In a footnote addressing dissenting Justice Brennan’s 
interpretation of several of the Framers’ debates and essays, Justice 
Powell observed that the Framers never questioned the idea that the 
Constitution created a system that expressly allocated some authority 
to the national government and left the remainder to the several 
states, and Powell cited Federalist 39 to support this observation.85  
Federalist 39 next surfaced in the Eleventh Amendment case 
Alden v. Maine.86 The majority expanded the sovereign immunity of 
the states beyond the language of the Eleventh Amendment, holding 
that Congress could not subject a state to suit in state court without 
the state’s express consent.87 Justice Kennedy based his opinion on 
the structure of Constitution, presumably because he found no 
 83. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 743; Alden, 527 U.S. 706; Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234. 
The Eleventh Amendment, adopted in 1798, provides: “The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 84. 473 U.S. at 239–40. Atascadero raised the question of the ability of states to be sued 
in federal court under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which 
prohibited states from discriminating against handicapped persons. Id. at 244–46. The Act 
would have subjected states to the remedies for employment discrimination in Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d). Id. at 245. The Court held that the Eleventh 
Amendment barred private action against the states unless the language of the Act itself 
contained an express indication of the intent of Congress to abrogate the states’ rights under the 
Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 247. The Court found that since this express intent was absent 
from the Rehabilitation Act, the Eleventh Amendment prohibited suit. Id. 
 85. Id. at 238 n.2. 
 86. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 87. Id. at 712. Alden addressed Congress’s ability to subject states to private action under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 711–12 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 201). Despite the fact that 
Congress had included in the Act an express abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
rights, which would have been sufficient to allow federal suit under Scanlon, the Alden Court 
held that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment rights, id. at 751. To subject a state to private action, Alden required the express 
consent of the states. Id. at 712. 
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support for his position either in the text of the Eleventh Amendment 
or elsewhere in the Constitution.88 In assessing the Constitution’s 
structure, Justice Kennedy observed that under the Constitution, state 
governments retain a substantial amount of sovereignty.89 Justice 
Kennedy conceded that the states cannot be considered truly 
sovereign bodies. However, he claimed that in spite of this fact, the 
states retain the dignity accorded a sovereign body.90 Justice Kennedy 
then claimed that because the states retain this amorphous dignity, the 
national government cannot subject them to private suit without their 
consent.91 To endorse this novel approach, Justice Kennedy quoted 
extensively from Madison and Federalist 39.92 
In Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports 
Authority,93 the Court again cited Federalist 39 as authority to further 
expand the states’ sovereign immunity power under the Eleventh 
Amendment. In Federal Maritime Commission, the Court held that 
the principle of sovereign immunity precluded a national 
administrative agency from adjudicating a private party’s complaint 
against a state-run organization.94 
Like the Scanlon and Alden Courts, the Court in Federal Maritime 
Commission based its decision not on the language of the Eleventh 
Amendment, which would not have supported its novel expansion,95 
but on the concept of dual sovereignty.96 Justice Thomas, writing for 
 88. Id at 712–13 (stating that the insulation of the states from suits prosecuted by 
individuals does not derive from the text of the Eleventh Amendment, but from the history and 
structure of the Constitution itself). 
 89. Id. at 714. 
 90. Id. at 715 (arguing that the states are “not mere provinces . . . but retain the dignity, 
though not the full authority of sovereignty.”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 714–15. 
 93. 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 94. Id. at 751–52. In Federal Maritime Commission, the Court held that state sovereign 
immunity barred the Federal Maritime Commission from hearing a private action against a 
state-run port authority. Id. at 747. For purposes of Eleventh Amendment analysis, the Court 
held that FMC proceedings are analogous to federal adjudications because subjecting states to 
administrative action would work the same “indignity” on the states as would suit in a federal 
court. Id. at 759. 
 95. Id. at 754. Justice Thomas conceded that the Eleventh Amendment would not support 
his holding, but justified his position by stating simply, “the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the 
States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. 
 96. Id. at 753 (finding that an important part of the sovereignty the states retained under 
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the Court, relied on Federalist 39 to support his claim that a key 
aspect of the sovereignty that the states retained after ratifying of the 
Constitution was absolute immunity from private lawsuits, despite 
this power’s express exclusion from the Constitution itself.97 
2. Tenth Amendment Cases 
While the three Eleventh Amendment cases that cite Federalist 39 
are fairly consistent in their use of the essay, the five Tenth 
Amendment cases cite Federalist 39 in a variety of contexts, often to 
support completely opposing arguments. Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority was the first Tenth Amendment case 
in which the Court relied upon Federalist 39.98 The majority and the 
dissent both cite Federalist 39 to endorse opposing views of the 
Tenth Amendment.99 
In Garcia, the Court held that a municipal or state agency was not 
immune from the minimum wage standards of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA).100 The decision came on the heels of National 
League of Cities v. Usery,101 where the Court had held that the 
Commerce Clause did not empower Congress to enforce the FLSA 
against the States.102 In Garcia, Justice Blackmun found that the 
“areas of traditional government function” test from National League 
was unworkable and had unnecessarily restricted Congress’s 
the Constitution was their immunity from private suit). 
 97. Id. at 754. 
 98. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 99. Id. at 550, 570. 
 100. Id. at 530–31. Garcia arose out of a declaratory judgment action brought by the San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, which sought judgment that, as a state agency, it was 
immune under the Tenth Amendment from the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of 
the FLSA. Id. at 530. Garcia held that conferring upon state employees the protections of the 
FLSA was a proper action under the Commerce Clause and was not destructive of the states’ 
sovereignty. Id. at 530–31. As such, the Court found no violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id. 
 101. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 102. Id. at 852. National League, decided just eight years before Garcia, had held that the 
Tenth Amendment forbade Congress from making the states, as employers, subject to the 
FLSA. Id. at 836. The Court held that under the Tenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause did 
not empower Congress to regulate states in “areas of traditional governmental functions.” Id. at 
852. However, the National League Court offered no definition of “traditional governmental 
functions,” leaving future courts no way to distinguish between traditional and non-traditional 
governmental functions. 469 U.S. at 530. 
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Commerce Clause authority.103 Justice Blackmun stated that the 
proper focus of the law should be Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause, not its limitations under the Tenth Amendment.104 
In finding that Congress had not overstepped its Commerce Clause 
authority, Justice Blackmun noted that state sovereignty is, in fact, 
limited by the Constitution.105 Justice Blackmun found that the 
sovereignty retained by the states was adequately protected by the 
procedural safeguards existing at the national level, and judicially 
invented limitations on the national government were not 
necessary.106 To support this position, Justice Blackmun cited several 
of Madison’s works, including Federalist 39.107 
Ironically, Justice Powell also cited Madison’s work, including 
Federalist 39, in his dissenting opinion.108 Justice Powell argued that 
Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to impose 
minimum wage standards on state and municipal governments as 
employers.109 Reading the Tenth Amendment expansively, Justice 
Powell argued that the balance of power between the national and 
state governments should reside more heavily with the states.110 
Justice Powell grounded his decision on the intent of the Framers, 
especially Madison, who he claimed believed that state governments 
would come to be more important that the national government.111 
Justice Powell relied heavily on Federalist 39 to support his basic 
proposition that, because the powers of the national government are 
enumerated within the Constitution, the Framers intended the 
Constitution to limit the power of the national government and 
affirmatively empower state governments.112 Justice Powell’s 
position was that the Constitution’s enumeration of the national 
powers represented a deliberate attempt by the Framers to protect the 
 103. 469 U.S. at 556–57. 
 104. Id. at 553–54. 
 105. Id. at 548. 
 106. Id. at 552. 
 107. Id. at 550. 
 108. Id. at 570 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 572. 
 110. Id. at 570–71. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 570–72. 
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sovereignty of the states.113 He believed the Tenth Amendment was 
merely evidence of this fact.114  
Eight years after the Garcia decision, the Supreme Court again 
cited Federalist 39 in a Tenth Amendment case, New York v. United 
States.115 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, argued that it is 
beyond the national government’s Commerce Clause authority to 
compel state governments to carry out an otherwise constitutional 
act.116 Justice O’Connor relied upon the “residuary and inviolable” 
passage of Federalist 39, which dealt with the extent of the national 
power, to support her proposition that the Tenth Amendment 
expressly reserved to the states a significant measure of 
sovereignty.117 
Like Justice Powell’s dissent in Garcia, Justice O’Connor based 
her majority opinion on the intent of the Framers and the structure of 
the Constitution.118 She found that the national government 
established under the Constitution was designed to act upon 
individuals directly, not upon states.119 Accordingly, Justice 
O’Connor found that it is beyond the authority of the national 
government to compel the states to act under a federal statute.120 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 579. 
 115. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 116. Id. at 149. The provision of the act in question required states to “take title” to any 
toxic waste generated within its borders which could not properly and safely be disposed. Id. at 
153–54 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(c)). This provision would have rendered states liable 
for any damages caused by such toxic wastes. Id. The Court held that, although Congress was 
within its Constitutional authority to regulate the disposal of toxic waste, the act’s “take title” 
provision constituted an impermissible attempt by Congress to coerce the states into complying 
with the broad national directive. Id. at 188. 
 117. Id. (finding that state governments are not agents of the national government, and as 
such, retain “residuary and inviolable” sovereignty, a principle articulated in the Tenth 
Amendment). Recognizing that there are limitations to the states’ sovereignty, Justice 
O’Connor found it would nonetheless be a violation of the state’s sovereignty for the national 
government to compel the States to enforce or enact a national regulatory scheme. Id. 
 118. Id. at 156–57. 
 119. Id. at 165–66 (finding that the Framers, unhappy with the inability under the Articles 
of Confederation of the national government to act upon individual citizens of the states, drafted 
a Constitution which would enable the national legislature to act directly on individuals, not 
states). 
 120. Id. at 166. 
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The Supreme Court again cited Federalist 39 in U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton.121 The references appear in both the concurring and 
dissenting opinions.122 The majority held that the Tenth Amendment 
does not permit Arkansas to amend its state constitution to impose 
term limits upon the service of United States Congressmen 
representing Arkansas.123 Justice Kennedy based his concurring 
opinion on his belief that the Framers intended for individuals, not 
states, to control the national government, and that they designed the 
national government to act through individuals, not states.124 To 
support his view, Justice Kennedy quoted, from Federalist 39, 
Madison’s argument that the United States House of Representatives 
derives its power from individual citizens.125 Justice Kennedy also 
quoted from Madison’s description of the proper operation of the 
national government in Federalist 39 and expressed that the national 
government should act directly upon individuals, not upon the 
states.126  
While Justice Kennedy joined the majority in restricting state 
power under the Tenth Amendment, his concurring opinion was 
friendlier to state sovereignty.127 Justice Kennedy relied on Federalist 
39 to support his claim that the Tenth Amendment severely restricts 
the power of national government.128 
 121. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 122. Id. at 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 123. The Amendment at issue, Section 3 of Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution, 
prohibited the names of Congressional candidates who had served three terms in the House of 
Representatives or two terms in the Senate to appear on the ballot. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. 
at 784. The Supreme Court rejected Arkansas’s Tenth Amendment claim and held that the 
Qualifications Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1, and the structure of the Constitution itself 
prohibited states from imposing requirements in addition to those enumerated in the 
Constitution’s text relating to the qualifications of national legislators. Id. at 783. 
 124. Id. at 845 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 125. Id. at 839. 
 126. Id. (“‘[T]he operation of the government upon the people in their individual 
capacities’ makes it ‘a national government,’ not merely a federal one.”) (quoting FEDERALIST 
39, at 244–45). 
 127. See id. at 841 (claiming that the Framers saw state power as essential to the balance of 
powers). 
 128. Id. (citing Federalist 39 to support the assertion that “the Constitution is solicitous of 
the prerogatives of the States, even in an otherwise sovereign federal [national] province.”). 
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion in Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 549 (2000) quoted 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in U.S. Term Limits. Id. at 549 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 514 U.S. at 841–42). The passage that Justice Ginsburg quoted includes Justice 
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Additionally, Justice Thomas cited Federalist 39 in his dissenting 
opinion. Thomas diverged from Justice Kennedy and the majority in 
his belief that the source of the Constitution’s authority was the 
consent of the citizens of the individual states, not the consent of all 
individuals in the nation as a whole.129 Justice Kennedy cited 
Federalist 39 to support the position that the power of the national 
government is derived from the actions of citizens acting as 
individuals, not as agents of the states.130 In contrast, Justice Thomas 
cited Federalist 39 to support the completely opposite view that the 
powers of the national government are derived from the actions of 
citizens acting through their respected states.131 Justice Thomas 
claimed that under the Tenth Amendment the states retain 
considerably more power than the majority opinion or Justice 
Kennedy were willing to concede.132  
Printz v. United States133 is the last Tenth Amendment case in 
which the Court cites Federalist 39. Based on the concept of dual 
sovereignty, the Court held that the national government may not 
command state officials to enforce federal law.134 Justice Scalia, 
Kennedy’s reference to Federalist 39 as supporting his proposition that “the Constitution is 
solicitous of the prerogatives of the States, even in an otherwise sovereign federal province.” Id. 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg takes an expansive view of state sovereignty, holding that, 
under the principles of American federalism, national courts defer to state courts’ 
interpretations of state law. Id. at 549. Since Justice Ginsburg’s opinion endorsed the expansion 
of state power over national power, albeit in a limited context, her reference to Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in U.S. Term Limits supports the notion that Justice Kennedy’s position 
should not be read to support the expansion of national power. Rather, despite Kennedy’s 
support for the outcome of the case, his concurrence should be read as interpreting Federalist 
39 to restrict national power. 
 129. 514 U.S. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 839. 
 131. Id. at 846 (citing Federalist 39 to support the claim that the “source of the 
Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of 
the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.”). 
 132. Id. at 925–26 (arguing that since the Qualifications Clause, which articulates the 
standards for election to the national legislature, does not expressly limit a state’s ability to 
condition its own qualifications, the power to do so is reserved to the states under the Tenth 
Amendment). 
 133. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 134. Id. at 920. In Printz the Court held that the national government lacked the 
constitutional authority to command state officials to enforce a provision of the Brady Handgun 
Violence Act. Id. at 935 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)). The provision at issue would have required 
state and local law enforcement officers to conduct a background check on all prospective 
handgun purchasers. Id. at 902. The Court held that without consent of the states, the national 
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writing for the Court, cited extensively from Madison and Federalist 
39,135 and even claimed that Madison would never have endorsed the 
view that the national government could direct employees of the 
states to enforce national law.136 
To support his initial argument that the Constitution established a 
system of dual sovereignty, Justice Scalia quoted from the “residuary 
and inviolable” passage of Federalist 39.137 Further establishing the 
separation of state and national powers, Justice Scalia quoted from 
the “spheres of authority” passage to support his claim that the 
function of the separation of the state and national spheres of 
authority is to ensure a healthy balance of power between the two.138 
Justice Scalia concluded that the ability of the national government to 
command state and local officials to execute national law and policy 
would substantially overstep its sphere of authority.139 
II. ANALYSIS 
The emergence of Federalist 39 as authority is an interesting 
feature of the Court’s recent expansion of state power under the 
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. Prior to its citation in Garcia in 
1985, Federalist 39 had never been cited in a United States Supreme 
Court decision addressing federalism. Because of its recent 
popularity and use as authority to support the expansion of state 
sovereignty, at first blush, it might seem like Federalist 39 actually 
represents an affirmation of state power relative to national power. 
However, after examining the language of Federalist 39 and the early 
federalist ideology of James Madison, it is clear that the Court’s use 
of Federalist 39 to endorse its expansion of state sovereignty is 
wholly inconsistent with the essay’s original meaning and with 
Madison’s early federalist ideology. 
government may not enlist state employees to enforce national law. Id. at 935. 
 135. See id. at 919–21. 
 136. Id. at 915 (claiming that the idea that the national government could direct state 
employees to enforce national law has “no clear support in Madison’s writings . . . .”). 
 137. Id. at 918–19. 
 138. Id. at 920–21. 
 139. Id. at 935. 
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The use of Federalist 39 in the three Eleventh Amendment cases 
is fairly consistent. In each case, the majority opinion cites the essay 
to advocate the expansion of state sovereign immunity. Each case 
relies upon Federalist 39 to support the general argument that an 
aspect of the “residual and inviolable sovereignty” the states retained 
through the drafting and ratification of the Constitution is immunity 
from private suit, except under certain judicially created and enforced 
conditions. 
Even the most liberal reading of Federalist 39 or interpretation of 
the early federalist ideology of James Madison could not begin to 
support the position that states retain some sort of intangible dignity 
that entitles them to absolute immunity from congressionally 
authorized suit in the absence of the states’ express consent to be 
sued. Such sweeping power is not conferred by the Eleventh 
Amendment or the rest of the Constitution. Nowhere in the text of 
Federalist 39 did Madison even begin to address questions raised by 
the Eleventh Amendment. The amendment was not even drafted until 
years after Madison wrote Federalist 39.  
The only proposition in the three opinions that Federalist 39 even 
arguably supports is that states retain some sovereignty under the 
Constitution, but the next question that naturally comes to mind is, 
how much sovereignty did Madison envision that the states would 
retain under the Constitution? An ancillary question, which is just as 
important for the purpose of this discussion, is how much sovereignty 
did Madison feel the states should retain under the Constitution? The 
answer to both questions must be that the states would, and should, 
retain a very limited amount of power. 
Among the four Tenth Amendment cases which employed 
Federalist 39, a number of similar interpretative patterns are 
apparent. First, all of the opinions that cite Federalist 39 use it to 
support the position that the Framers intended the states to retain 
some measure of sovereignty under the Constitution. While the 
opinions vary on exactly what amount of sovereignty the states 
retain, most opinions represent a significant expansion of the states 
power under the Tenth Amendment. Hence, the critical issue 
underlying the Court’s use of Federalist 39 is the nature of the 
sovereignty that the Constitution allocates to the states. The language 
of Federalist 39 cited in the Tenth and Eleventh Amendment cases, 
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interpreted in the context of Madison’s writings and debates, makes 
clear that Madison believed the Constitution allocated a very limited 
amount of sovereignty to state governments.  
By far, the most commonly cited passage from Federalist 39 in 
both the Tenth and Eleventh Amendment cases is the passage in 
which Madison’s discusses the extent of national power under the 
Constitution, the “residuary and inviolable” passage. The Court has 
consistently relied upon this passage as a ringing endorsement for the 
expansion of state power under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. 
Read in isolation, the Court’s use and interpretation of this passage is 
both sound and valid. However, read in the context of Federalist 39 
as a whole and Madison’s other writings, it is not at all clear whether 
the “residuary and inviolable” passage was intended to be the beacon 
of state sovereignty that the Court has found it to be. 
Within Federalist 39, the “residuary and inviolable” passage is 
embedded in Madison’s discussion of the extent of the Constitutional 
government’s power.140 Having just concluded that the operation of 
the government’s power can be properly designated as national, 
Madison stated that the extent of the government’s power is 
federal.141 In reaching this conclusion, Madison claimed: “the 
proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its 
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to 
the several states a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other 
objects.”142 In this light, the “residuary and inviolable” passage seems 
to be a restatement of the Tenth Amendment.143 Looking to 
Madison’s attitudes concerning the Tenth Amendment might shed 
some light on what Madison meant by the “residuary and inviolable” 
passage, and might also help to determine if Federalist 39 indeed 
supports the various opinions that cite it as authority in recent Tenth 
Amendment cases. 
Madison was initially an opponent of including the Bill of Rights 
in the Constitution, and was particularly concerned with the Tenth 
 140. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 285. 
 141. Id. at 286. Concluding his passage on the extent of the government’s powers, Madison 
merely stated that they are not national. Id. at 285. 
 142. Id. (emphasis added). 
 143. The Tenth Amendment reads: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States . . . .” 
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Amendment.144 Madison and his fellow federalist advocates of the 
Constitution agreed to implement a Bill of Rights as a compromise 
with anti-federalist opponents of the Constitution.145 When the 
language that would later become the Tenth Amendment was first 
proposed to the new Congress, heated debate ensued over whether 
the amendment should contain the term “expressly,” regarding 
Congress’s enumerated powers.146 The version proposed by James 
Madison and Virginia left the term out, but all other states proposed a 
version that included “expressly” or some derivation of the word.147  
The addition of the term “expressly” would have had the effect of 
making the text of the Tenth Amendment read: “The powers not 
expressly delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . . are 
reserved to the States . . . .” This proposed version of the Tenth 
Amendment strikingly resembled Article II of the former Articles of 
Confederation, which stated, “[e]ach State retains its sovereignty, 
freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, 
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United 
States . . . .”148 Madison led the fight at the First Congress against the 
inclusion of “expressly” in the Constitution’s Tenth Amendment.149 
Madison believed that such an addition to the Tenth Amendment 
would restrict an essential feature of the new Constitution’s 
government—the ability of the national government to exercise 
implied powers.150 Madison claimed that “there must necessarily be 
admitted powers by implication, unless the [C]onstitution descended 
to recount every minutiae.”151  
The historical background of Federalist 39 may also shed some 
light on the meaning of the “residuary and inviolable” passage. 
Federalist 39 was first published January 16, 1788, less than a year-
and-a-half before Madison introduced his proposed version of the 
 144. Staab, supra note 43, at 240. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 683. 
 147. Staab, supra note 43, at 240. 
 148. WOOD, supra note 27, at 358 (emphasis added). 
 149. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 683; see also supra note 45. 
 150. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 683; see also supra note 45 and 
accompanying text. 
 151. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 683 (emphasis added). 
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Tenth Amendment to Congress on June 8, 1789. Considering 
Madison’s outspoken opposition to the restriction of the national 
authority to those powers “expressly enumerated” in the 
Constitution,152 one must question Madison’s actual meaning in 
Federalist 39’s “residuary and inviolable” passage. Focusing on the 
language of the passage, Madison notably did not refer to the power 
of the national government, as the Tenth Amendment does.153 Rather, 
he referred to the jurisdiction of the national government as 
extending only to enumerated powers.154 Examining this distinction 
in light of Madison’s views of the Doctrine of Implication, it seems 
more than fair to say that Madison felt the jurisdiction of the national 
government should extend to the enumerated powers only, and also 
that he believed the national government’s power to act within its 
jurisdiction should not be so limited, but rather that the government’s 
power to supply the means to act within the ends enumerated in the 
Constitution were implied under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
The language of Federalist 39, read in the context of Madison’s 
decidedly restrictive position on the Tenth Amendment, presents a 
clearer picture of the meaning of the “residuary and inviolable” 
passage, a picture of a framer not at all friendly to the cause of state 
sovereignty. Madison was not, as Justice Scalia would have us 
believe in Printz v. United States,155 a framer sensitive to the 
authority of the states. 
Analysis of the “spheres of authority” passage of Federalist 39, 
which both the Tenth and Eleventh Amendment cases also rely upon 
heavily, further clarifies this image of Madison. Close attention to the 
actual language of the passage is warranted here, because it is not 
what Madison says, but what he does not say, that is critical. In 
comparing the two “spheres of authority” that form the basis of his 
analysis, Madison describes the two systems as “national” and “local 
or municipal.”156 Nowhere in the passage does Madison use the term 
 152. See supra note 45. 
 153. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 285. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See 521 U.S. 898, 915 (1997) (arguing that while Hamilton might have endorsed the 
view that the national government could instruct state officials to execute national directives, 
Madison would not have endorsed such a policy). 
 156. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 284–85. 
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“federal” to describe his model governments.157 Madison only 
contends that the Constitution does not contemplate the first, 
“national” system.158 At no point in Madison’s description of the 
second, “local” system, in which the governing authority of the 
national government cannot act, does he call this system “federal,”159 
a term which Madison uses elsewhere in Federalist 39 to refer to a 
system involving strong state governments.160 Hence, using this 
passage to describe the respected powers of the states in a 
contemplated federal system clearly takes the passage far out of 
context. 
However, assuming arguendo that Madison actually made a 
mistake and intended the second described, “local” system to 
represent his vision, the “spheres of authority” passage still does not 
draw a clear boundary line between these two spheres. Again, 
reference to Madison’s debates and writings helps clarify exactly 
what is meant by the “spheres of authority” passage. 
Madison believed that one of the greatest vices plaguing the 
Articles of Confederation was the states’ persistent encroachment on 
the national government’s authority.161 Madison carried this belief 
with him to the Convention where he was an outspoken advocate of a 
large-scale expansion of the national government.162 Madison felt the 
likelihood that state governments would encroach upon the national 
government was far greater than the likelihood that the national 
government would intrude upon the states.163 Furthermore, Madison 
believed that the impact of state intrusion upon the national 
government would be far more detrimental than the impact of the 
national government’s encroachment upon the states.164 
Madison compared the proper constitutional dynamic between the 
national and state governments to the existing structure of state and 
 157. Id. at 284. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 285. 
 160. See id. at 283. 
 161. WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 69; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 25–28 and text accompanying notes 25–33. 
 163. 1 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 316 (criticizing Patterson’s New Jersey Plan), 356 
(discussing these findings); see also supra note 18. 
 164. 1 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 356; see also supra note 18. 
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municipal governments.165 He reasoned that a grant of indefinite 
power to the national government would not give the national 
government an incentive to intrude upon state power.166 Madison 
believed that state governments were mere objects of convenience.167 
He objected to the dissolution of state governments entirely, 
primarily because it would be impractical for the national 
government to govern all the tasks undertaken by the state and local 
governments.168 Madison firmly believed that the state governments 
were, under the Constitution’s design, totally and functionally 
subordinate to the national government,169 in stark contrast to Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.170 
Another concern underlying Madison’s distrust of state 
governments was the issue of the rights of minorities.171 Madison 
believed one of the greatest evils of strong state governments was 
that majority factions easily could form at the state level, trammeling 
the rights of minority interests.172 While he recognized that factions 
could also form on a national level, Madison believed that in small 
arenas it was much easier for majorities to organize and violate the 
rights of minorities.173 This concern compelled Madison to advocate 
for absolute veto power over state laws vested in the national 
legislature.174 Madison believed that one of the most important 
responsibilities of the new national government was to control the 
often radical tendencies of the state governments.175 He believed that 
 165. 1 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 357. 
 166. Id. at 357–58. 
 167. Id. at 357. 
 168. Id. Madison took the drastic position that “[s]upposing . . . a tendency in the [General] 
Government to absorb the State [Governments] no fatal consequence would result.” Id. at 358. 
 169. 3 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 134 (claiming that the general authority will be derived 
entirely from the subordinate authorities). 
 170. 469 U.S. 528, 571 (1985). 
 171. See supra note 19. 
 172. See WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 149 (letter from Madison to Thomas Jefferson dated 
October 24, 1787); discussion supra note 19. 
 173. See WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 151–52 (letter from Madison to Thomas Jefferson 
dated October 24, 1787). 
 174. Id. at 146. 
 175. 1 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 165 (stating that a central responsibility of the national 
government must be to “controul the centrifugal tendency of the States”). 
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without broad power vested in the national government to ensure 
state compliance with national policy directives,176 the states would 
“continually fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the order and 
harmony of the political system.”177 
Reading the “spheres of authority” passage in the context of 
Madison’s other writings and debates, it becomes clear that Madison 
would not support limitations on the scope of national power within 
its proper sphere, although he certainly would concede that the 
national government’s sphere of authority extends only over those 
objects specifically enumerated in the Constitution.178 Madison’s 
writings and debates also make clear that he believed that the 
inherently subordinate and local nature of state governments severely 
limited their “sphere” of authority. Madison felt an extensive national 
government would provide the greatest protection for the union and 
the individual against the dangers of faction and the mischief of the 
state governments. He even claimed, the more extensive the power of 
the national government, the “greater the probability of [its] duration, 
happiness and good order.”179 
Madison’s expressed views regarding the proper balance of power 
between the national and state governments has had a tremendous 
impact on the Supreme Court’s use of Federalist 39. One of the 
primary arguments made for the expansion of state power in the 
Eleventh Amendment cases was that the states retain a “sovereign 
dignity” under the Constitution which barred nationally authorized 
suit against them. Considering Madison’s belief that state 
governments are inherently subordinate and properly exercise 
authority only where convenient to the national government, it is 
clear that he would not have endorsed the expansion of state 
sovereignty under the rationale employed by the Rehnquist Court. 
 176. Three examples of such powers endorsed by Madison at the Convention were: (1) the 
national legislative veto over state laws, 2 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 27; (2) the power of the 
national legislature to enact temporary state laws, id. at 28; and (3) the power of the national 
legislature to use force to coerce disobedient states into compliance with national directives, 1 
RECORDS, supra, at 164. 
 177. 1 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 165. 
 178. Further evidence supporting this position can be taken from Madison’s opinion 
regarding the “Doctrine of Implied Powers.” See supra note 45; THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 
(James Madison). 
 179. 1 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 141. 
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Rather, Madison likely would have viewed the “dignity” rationale, 
and the Court’s recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, as a 
grave threat to both the proper operation of government and the rights 
of minorities who are now unable to bring federal action to address 
their grievances against the states. Madison believed that two of the 
most essential duties of the national government under the 
Constitution were to ensure that the states (1) would not disrupt the 
proper function of government by acting in their own self interest and 
(2) would not trammel the rights of minorities within their borders.180 
The Court’s Eleventh Amendment decisions, stripping the national 
government of its power to enforce its laws against disobedient 
states, are clearly inimical to Madison’s core federalist ideology. 
The Court’s Tenth Amendment decisions stand in even greater 
contrast to Madison’s early federalist ideology. Given Madison’s 
viewpoint on the legislative veto, his belief that implied powers were 
essential to the proper function of the national government, and his 
fight for the exclusion of the term “expressly” from the Tenth 
Amendment, any assertion that Madison would have supported the 
position that the Tenth Amendment constitutes an “express” 
limitation of the national government’s power under the Constitution 
is simply inaccurate. 
CONCLUSION 
James Madison was arguably our nation’s most influential and 
important philosopher and politician. His unique ideas about the 
proper operation of government helped shape our Constitution, and 
they continue to inspire scholars and leaders around the world. It is 
unfortunate that members of our nation’s highest Court recently have 
corrupted Madison’s writings to support a flawed vision of the proper 
balance of power. It is essential for citizens and scholars to 
understand and appreciate Madison as he was: a brilliant nationalist 
visionary who believed that only through an expansive, centralized 
national government would the Union of States function properly and 
effectively.
 180. See WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 151–52 (letter from Madison to Thomas Jefferson 
dated October 24, 1787); 1 RECORDS, supra note 26, at 165. 
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